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POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY AND ITS LIMITS:
LESSONS FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION IN CALIFORNIA
Joseph R. Grodin*
California’s pressing structural problems require changes to the
California Constitution that may be difficult to accomplish through the
current constitution’s three stated means of reform. In response,
coalition reform groups, such as Repair California, have proposed
amending the constitution to authorize the calling of a constitutional
convention through an initiative measure. This Article focuses on the
state, constitutional, and procedural issues that may arise from such a
change. Through an analysis of the relevant California Supreme Court
decisions since 1911, this Article concludes that there is indeed a
principled basis for sustaining the constitutional validity of an initiative
measure amending the constitution to permit a constitutional
convention called by the people, for authorizing a different method of
selecting convention delegates, and for allowing such an initiative to
limit the convention’s scope to certain specified subjects.

* Distinguished Emeritus Professor, University of California Hastings College of the Law;
former Associate Justice, California Supreme Court. The author wishes to acknowledge the
valuable assistance of several Hastings students, including Amy Stein, Eric Martin, Erin Kuka,
and Kerry Galusha.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Whether a constitutional convention is a good idea for
California as a way to try and resolve the pressing structural
problems that confront the state is, no doubt, a debatable question.
There are legitimate concerns about the time and resources required,
about the recommendations that would be forthcoming, and about
each of the recommendation’s individual acceptability to the
electorate. There are also powerful arguments supporting the position
that nothing short of a constitutional convention is likely to bring
about the needed changes. This Article focuses on the state
constitutional, procedural issues that are likely to arise from any
proposal for a convention that departs from the format prescribed by
the current California Constitution. I take for my model the
propositions that were advanced in 2010 by coalition reform group
Repair California 1 but that did not qualify for placement on the
ballot.
The California Constitution provides in article XVIII three
methods by which the constitution may be changed: (1) it can be
amended through a popular initiative, i.e., an initiative measure
placed on the ballot through petitions carrying the requisite number
of signatures; (2) it can be amended or revised through a legislative
initiative, i.e., a measure placed on the ballot through a two-thirds
vote of each house of the legislature; or (3) it can be revised through
a constitutional convention. 2
The popular-initiative amendment process is potentially
available for narrowly targeted changes, but any “structural”
changes, such as those presented in many of the proposals that have
been advanced, are likely to be considered “revisions” rather than
“amendments” and thus not amenable to that procedure. 3 The
legislative initiative process is potentially available for revisions as
well as amendments, and would be well suited to the sorts of
1. See About the Convention, REPAIR CAL., http://www.repaircalifornia.org/
about_california_convention.php (last visited Feb. 21, 2011).
2. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII. California’s procedure for constitutional change through
initiative is virtually unique. See generally TIP H. ALLEN, JR. & COLEMAN B. RANSON, JR.,
CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1962) (summarizing the many state
procedures for constitutional revision and amendment).
3. See JOSEPH R. GRODIN ET AL., THE CALIFORNIA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE
GUIDE 23 (1993).
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structural changes that have been proposed, especially through the
medium of a “Constitution Revision Commission,” which has been
used in the past to make recommendations to the legislature for
placement on the ballot. 4 However, in the present state of political
disarray, the likelihood of two-thirds of each house of the legislature
agreeing to place any even mildly controversial proposal on the
ballot appears slim. That leaves the convention alternative.
Article XVIII, section 2 provides as follows:
The Legislature by roll call vote entered in the journal, twothirds of the membership of each house concurring, may
submit at a general election the question whether to call a
convention to revise the Constitution. If the majority vote
yes on that question, within 6 months the Legislature shall
provide for the convention. Delegates to a constitutional
convention shall be voters elected from districts as nearly
equal in population as may be practicable. 5
So, the possibility exists that the legislature could propose a
convention pursuant to article XVIII, section 2. But the proponents
of the Repair California initiatives were concerned about the
following potential problems: (1) the probability of two-thirds of the
members of each house of the legislature agreeing to a call for a
convention is small, smaller even than the probability of the
legislature agreeing to propose specific constitutional revisions; (2)
the prescribed method for selection of delegates through popular
election would not be acceptable to those (presumably numerous)
citizens who would likely view it as a means of replicating the
existing and unpopular legislative bodies; and (3) no call for a
convention is likely to succeed, unless the convention’s subject
matter can be limited in advance. 6

4. See generally Eugene G. Lee, The Revision of California’s Constitution, 3 CPS BRIEF 3,
4–6 (1991), available at http://www.repaircalifornia.org/Docs/california_history.pdf (providing
background following passage of ACR 188, which requires in part the presentation of alternative
proposals for constitutional revision).
5. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 2.
6. See, e.g., Mike Aldax, State Seeking Conventional Wisdom on Constitution, S.F.
EXAMINER, Nov. 27, 2009, available at http://www.sfexaminer.com/local/State-seekingconventional-wisdom-on-constitution-76349807.html; Hendrik Hertzberg, The States We’re In,
NEW YORKER, Aug. 24 2009, available at http://www.newyorker.com/talk/comment/2009/08/24/
090824taco_talk_hertzberg; Elise Viebeck, Failed Convention Post-Mortem, CAL. WATCHDOG
(Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.calwatchdog.com/2010/03/18/new-failed-convention-post-mortem.
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Acting on these premises, Repair California and its supporters
advanced an initiative measure to amend article XVIII by adding
provisions to authorize calling a constitutional convention through an
initiative measure. Further, that initiative measure would have both
prescribed a procedure for selection of delegates and limited the
subject matter the delegates could consider—with the limitation
being enforceable through judicial writ. A companion initiative
measure, contingent upon passage of the first, would have called for
a convention pursuant to that authorization. 7
The doctrine of popular sovereignty supported the legal theory
behind this proposal. That doctrine finds expression in article II,
section 1 of the state constitution: “All political power is inherent in
the people. Government is instituted for their protection, security,
and benefit, and they have the right to alter or reform it when the
public good may require.” 8 The threshold questions, which apply
both to the legitimacy of bypassing the legislature and to the
designation of a different method for selecting delegates, are whether
“the people,” having once chosen a particular procedure for altering
or amending their form of government, are forever limited by that
choice, or whether they may adopt a different procedure, and if so,
how? Since the constitution says nothing about limiting or not
limiting a convention’s subject matter, the question of whether a call
for a convention may effectively provide for limitations is of a
different order, and will be considered last.
II. MAY THE INITIATIVE PROCESS BE USED TO MODIFY THE
CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION TO PROVIDE THAT A CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION CAN BE CALLED THROUGH USE OF THE
INITIATIVE WITHOUT LEGISLATIVE ACTION?
Surprisingly, there is a dearth of relevant judicial authority on
this question. In several cases state courts have upheld, in the
absence of express constitutional authority, the validity of wholesale
constitutional revisions adopted by the voters upon submission by
the state legislature. In these cases, the courts relied on the theory of
popular sovereignty to conclude that the convention procedure was
not necessarily the exclusive procedure by which the state
7. See Constitutional Convention Ballot Measures Fact Sheet, REPAIR CAL.,
http://www.repaircalifornia.org/Docs/repair_california_fact_sheet.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2011).
8. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 1.
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constitution could be changed, and that ultimate ratification of the
legislative proposals by the people was sufficient. 9
These cases have been subject to criticism, both in judicial
opinion 10 and in scholarly writing, 11 and it appears from dicta in its
early decision in Livermore v. Waite 12 that the California Supreme
Court might have sided with the naysayers on the issue that those
cases addressed. The legislature sought to place on the ballot a
constitutional amendment to what was then article XX, section 1 of
the state constitution. The purpose was to change the seat of
government from Sacramento to San Jose, but by its terms the
amendment would not become effective unless the state received a
“donation” of $1 million and ten acres of land in San Jose, and
elected state officials approved the new site. 13 In a taxpayer action to
restrain the secretary of state from taking steps to submit the
proposal to the electors, the trial court granted an injunction, and the
Supreme Court affirmed. 14

9. Wheeler v. Board of Trs., 37 S.E.2d 322 (Ga. 1946) (holding that a legislative
submission of proposed new constitution to the people for ratification was a permissible method
of revising the constitution, and any constitutional defect cured by a vote of the people is in the
exercise of their sovereignty); Smith v. Cenarrusa, 475 P.2d 11 (Idaho 1970); Gatewood v.
Matthews, 403 S.W.2d 716 (Ky. Ct. App. 1966) (discussing the submission of a draft constitution
to the electorate as being merely an exercise of the people’s inherent right to change their
government, and that the constitutionally prescribed procedures for adopting a new constitution
need not be followed).
10. State v. Manley, 441 So.2d 864 (Ala. 1983) (rejecting the reasoning in these cases and
insisting on strict adherence to constitutionally prescribed procedures).
11. Michael G. Colantuono, Comment, The Revision of State Constitutions: Legislative
Power, Popular Sovereignty, and Constitutional Change, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1473 (1987); Recent
Case, Adoption and Amendment of Constitutions: Legislature May Disregard Prescribed
Procedure as Long as the Proposed Constitution Is Submitted for Popular Ratification:
Gatewood v. Matthews, 81 HARV. L. REV. 693 (1968). There exists a wealth of debate over the
notion of sovereignty and the validity of extra-textual change under the U.S. Constitution. See,
e.g., Akhil R. Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V,
94 COLUM. L. REV. 457 (1994) (arguing people retain an unenumerated right to alter the U.S.
Constitution by means other than those prescribed by article V); Raymond Ku, Consensus of the
Governed: The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 535 (1995)
(criticizing Amar’s theory and positing that constitutional change is legitimate only when it
represents the will of the people as a whole acting in their sovereign capacity); James W. Torke,
Assessing the Ackerman and Amar Theses: Notes on Extratextual Constitutional Change, 4
WIDENER J. PUB. L. 229 (1994). Because there exists in the federal system characteristics of dual
sovereignty—the states and the people—the issues are not precisely the same.
12. 36 P. 424 (Cal. 1894).
13. Id. at 424–25.
14. Id. at 425–28.
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The actual holding in Livermore was quite narrow. The
constitution at that time permitted an amendment to be placed on the
ballot by a two-thirds vote of each house of the legislature, and were
it not for the conditions the legislature attached, there would have
been no problem. But, the court said:
The Legislature was not authorized by the framers of the
constitution, nor do the terms of that instrument permit it to
propose any amendment that will not, upon its adoption by
the people, become an effective part of the constitution, nor
is it authorized to propose an amendment which, if ratified,
will take effect only at the will of other persons, or upon the
approval by such persons of some specific act or
condition . . . . Such a proposition is legislative in character,
rather than [constitutional]. 15
The court’s opinion in Livermore, however, contains rather
expansive dicta:
Article 18 of the constitution provides two methods by
which changes may be effected in that instrument, one by a
convention of delegates chosen by the people for the
express purpose of revising the entire instrument, and the
other through the adoption of by the people of propositions
for specific amendments that have been previously
submitted to it by two-thirds of the members of each branch
of the legislature. It can be neither revised nor amended
except in the manner prescribed by itself, and the power
which it has conferred upon the legislature in reference to
proposed amendments, as well as to calling a convention,
must be strictly pursued. Under the first of these methods,
the entire sovereignty of the people is represented in the
convention. The character and extent of a constitution that
may be framed by that body is freed from any limitations
other than those contained in the constitution of the United
States . . . . The power of the Legislature to initiate any
change in the existing organic law is, however, of greatly
less extent and, being a delegated power, is to be strictly

15. Id. at 427.
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construed under the limitations by which it has been
conferred. 16
While Livermore spoke in terms of limits on legislative
authority, similar reasoning underlaid the California court’s
subsequent decision in McFadden v. Jordan, 17 to the effect that the
initiative process cannot be used to adopt a constitutional revision, as
distinguished from an amendment. 18 The proposed initiative in that
case, addressing multifarious subjects, was deemed to constitute a
revision and was therefore not an appropriate subject for the
initiative power.
But all of these cases involved attempts to obtain voter approval
for constitutional changes submitted contrary to constitutionally
prescribed procedures. To the extent that courts have insisted on
compliance with such procedures, the courts have implemented the
citizens’ original (and sovereign) intent. That is quite different,
however, from saying that the prescribed procedures may not be
changed, as was proposed in the draft initiative to allow the initiative
to be used to call for a constitutional convention.
But then the question remains whether the initiative process may
properly be used to make such a change or whether such a change
can only be made through a revision either propounded by the
legislature or adopted by a constitutional convention proposed by the
legislature. In Amador Valley Joint Union High School District v.
State Board of Equalization, 19 the court, while upholding Proposition
13’s sweeping tax reforms as merely an amendment, acknowledged
that “even a relatively simple enactment may accomplish such far
reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to
amount to a revision.” 20 Proposition 13 did not reach that level
because the measure’s qualitative effects on the distribution of
powers between state and local government, and on local
government, were neither substantial nor novel. 21

16. Id. at 425.
17. 196 P.2d 787 (Cal. 1948).
18. Id. at 789.
19. 583 P.2d 1281 (Cal. 1978).
20. Id. at 1286.
21. See id. at 1284–89 (explaining that the analysis for determining whether a particular
constitutional enactment is a revision or an amendment must be both quantitative and qualitative
in nature and then outlining the reasons why Proposition 13 fails to meet that standard).
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In Raven v. Deukmejian, 22 the court, for the first (and only) time,
struck down an initiative as constituting a revision on “qualitative”
grounds. There, it held that a measure that would have required
California courts, in applying state constitutional provisions in
criminal proceedings, to adhere to interpretations of similar
provisions in the U.S. Constitution would make such a fundamental
change in the role of the judiciary and in the rights of criminal
defendants as to constitute a revision rather than an amendment. 23
Two years later, in Legislature of California v. Eu, 24 the court upheld
use of the initiative to establish term limits for legislators and to limit
amounts that could be spent on legislative staffs. 25 This was an
amendment because it left the legislative branch substantially
unchanged; the test, the court said, is whether it appears “necessarily
or inevitably . . . from the face of the challenged provision that the
measure will substantially alter the basic governmental framework
set forth in our Constitution.” 26 Most recently, in Strauss v. Horton, 27
the court upheld Proposition 8, which modified the constitution to
declare marriage an institution involving a man and a woman,
contrary to the court’s own prior decision declaring same-sex
couples’ right to marry to be a fundamental right protected by both
the privacy and equal protection provisions of the California
Constitution. 28 Such a change, the court said, constitutes an
amendment rather than a revision: as a quantitative matter,
Proposition 8 “adds but a single, simple section to the
Constitution,” 29 and as a qualitative matter, “the act of limiting
access to the designation of marriage to opposite-sex couples does
not have a substantial, or indeed even a minimal effect on the
governmental plan or framework of California that existed prior to
the amendment.” 30
22. 801 P.2d 1077 (Cal. 1990).
23. See id. at 1079–90 (holding that, for the first time in California’s history, Proposition 115
substantially alters the preexisting constitutional scheme to the extent that it directly contradicts
well-established jurisprudential principles).
24. 816 P.2d 1309 (Cal. 1991).
25. See id.
26. Id. at 1319.
27. 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009).
28. Id. at 59, 122.
29. Id. at 62.
30. Id.
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So, would a measure authorizing use of the initiative to call for a
constitutional convention have a substantial effect on the
governmental plan or framework of California? Arguably, it would
by making it easier to bring about such a convention. And if that
argument is correct, then there would be no way to achieve the
sought-after result short of persuading two-thirds of each house of
the legislature either to propose such a change or to propose a
constitutional convention at which such a change could be adopted.
But if that argument is correct, what about the 1962
modification—achieved through the initiative process—which, for
the first time, gave the legislature the authority to propose
constitutional revisions without the necessity of calling a
convention? 31 Did that not have a substantial effect on the
governmental plan or framework of the state? And more
fundamentally, what about the 1911 initiative, which introduced
direct democracy into state governance? 32 It is difficult to imagine a
more substantial change in government structure than the people
asserting the power to bypass the legislature’s lawmaking ability (the
initiative) and blocking the implementation of laws adopted by the
legislature (the referendum). Yet, it appears that no question was
raised as to the people’s power to make those changes through the
ballot, rather than through a constitutional convention, which, then as
now, the legislature was unlikely to propose. And if that is the case,
then both of these changes should have been regarded as invalid. But
it does not appear that such an objection was ever raised, and
certainly not in court. How do we explain these constitutional
phenomena?
One possible explanation is that in these ancient times, before
the enlightenment of Raven, it was assumed that only a completely
new constitution would qualify as a revision, leaving all other
changes possible through amendment. 33 But while the Livermore
court did mention a “revision of the entire constitution” 34 as its only

31. See GRODIN ET AL., supra note 3, at 302.
32. Id. at 17–18.
33. The 1849 constitution used the phrase “entire constitution” in relation to “revision,” but
the 1879 constitution eliminated the word “entire.” Whether that change is of significance is
debatable. See Karl Manheim & Edward P. Howard, A Structural Theory of the Initiative Power
in California, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1165, 1219 n.343 (1998).
34. Livermore v. Waite, 36 P. 424, 426 (Cal. 1894).
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example of what would fall in the revision category, it said that the
term “amendment implies such an addition or change within the lines
of the original instrument as will effect an improvement, or better
carry out the purpose for which it was framed.” 35 Thus, it seems
unlikely that the court thought a legislatively proposed amendment
could be used for anything short of adopting a completely revised
document or that it would have regarded the wholesale transfer of
power from the legislature to the people through direct democracy as
constituting a mere “improvement” within the lines of the original
document.
Moreover, whatever the proper line of distinction between a
revision and an amendment prior to Raven was, does the “modern”
test mean that the 1911 and 1962 changes should now be held invalid
because they both involved substantial changes to the governmental
plan or framework? Or is it, because of some implicit limitation
period on the assertion of constitutional objections, simply too late to
raise that question? 36
Perhaps the better answer is that both the 1911 and 1962
amendments lay within the people’s power to facilitate and extend
the expression of their own sovereignty. In one case they did so by
providing for direct popular control over lawmaking and in the other
by making it easier to effect constitutional change. Such processes by
which those changes were made either lay outside the traditional
distinction between amendment and revision or constituted
amendments rather than revisions because they did not affect the
distribution of powers among the branches.
In any event, the court’s apparent openness since Raven to use
the initiative to make constitutional change, as well as the precedents
established by the unchallenged changes from 1911 and 1962, tend
to support the view that an initiative measure to facilitate the holding
of a constitutional convention would pass constitutional muster.

35. Id.
36. Manheim & Howard, supra note 33, at 1234–35 (“[B]ecause the device adopted in 1911
did not lay ‘within the lines of the original instrument,’ . . . it seems to have been a revision. As
such, the initiative process was likely improperly adopted. . . . [But] is there not a point at which
it becomes legitimate through acceptance, history, and usage?”).
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III. ASSUMING THE INITIATIVE PROCESS CAN BE USED TO
CHANGE THE CONSTITUTION TO AUTHORIZE USE OF AN
INITIATIVE TO CALL FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION,
CAN IT ALSO AUTHORIZE SUCH AN INITIATIVE TO
PROVIDE FOR THE SELECTION OF CONVENTION DELEGATES BY A
DIFFERENT METHOD THAN THAT SPECIFIED IN THE
CURRENT CONSTITUTION?
Is there a difference of constitutional dimension between
changing the constitution to make it easier to call for a constitutional
convention and changing it to provide for the selection of delegates
in a different manner? Allowing for the selection of delegates in a
different manner opens the door to manipulation of the results, to the
detriment of minority interests deserving of protection against
majority dominance. This might have been the case, for example, if
the proponents of the measure held invalid in Raven had sought to
further their goal by calling for a constitutional convention with
delegates chosen from among prosecutors throughout the state. But
any plan for the selection of delegates would have to comply with
federal equal protection principles, as well as the requirements of the
federal Voting Rights Act. 37 Moreover, the California Supreme
Court’s decision in Strauss seems to have rejected the argument that
the California Constitution contains provisions that are so embedded
that they cannot be altered by initiative. It would certainly be
preferable, for both legal and policy reasons, that any initiative
authorizing modifications in the delegate-selection procedure provide
for a method that is broadly representative of the electorate. 38 Subject
to that qualification, the answer to the question posed in the heading
to this part would seem to be yes.

37. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973–1973aa-6 (2006).
38. See Constitutional Convention Ballot Measures Fact Sheet, supra note 7. The Repair
California proposal for authorizing a convention call would have required “fair methods for
selecting or electing delegates.” Id. The proposal for the convention call prescribed a rather
elaborate procedure.
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IV. ON THE SAME ASSUMPTION, CAN THE INITIATIVE AUTHORIZING
USE OF AN INITIATIVE TO CALL FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
ALSO AUTHORIZE SUCH AN INITIATIVE TO PROVIDE
THAT THE CONVENTION WILL BE LIMITED TO, OR NOT EXTEND TO,
CERTAIN SPECIFIED SUBJECTS?
There is language in Livermore that would suggest the answer is
no: “[T]he entire sovereignty of the people is represented in the
convention. The character and extent of a constitution that may be
framed by that body is freed from any limitations other than those
contained in the constitution of the United States.” 39 But Livermore
was decided before the 1911 direct-democracy amendments; this
statement was pure dicta—the court did not consider the possibility
that the call for the convention would itself place a limit on the scope
of issues to be considered. Furthermore, there is a substantial body of
authority, as well as reasoning, to support an affirmative response. 40
At the time Livermore was decided, there was virtually no
authority on or experience with limited constitutional conventions.
One leading treatise published in 1867 argued that limitations are
valid even if imposed by the legislature. 41 W. Dodd, writing in 1910,
expressed a contrary view of legislative authority. 42 Roger Hoar
proclaimed in his 1917 treatise on the basis of popular sovereignty
that while the legislature could not impose limitations, the people
could do so. 43 During the twentieth century, however, a consensus
emerged:
The prevailing view . . . treats a convention as the agent of
the people who have called it. Thus, where the people must
vote to approve the calling of a convention . . . the people
are seen to have given their implicit approval to limitations
39. Livermore, 36 P. at 426.
40. The authorities are gathered in Francis H. Heller, Limiting a Constitutional Convention:
The State Precedents, 3 CARDOZO L. REV. 562 (1982) and more recently in ROBERT F.
WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 392–97 (2009). See also Henry D.
Levine, Note, Limited Federal Constitutional Conventions: Implications of the State Experience,
11 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 127, 134 (1973) (discussing substantive limitations for conventions among
numerous states).
41. See JOHN ALEXANDER JAMESON, A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS:
THEIR HISTORY, POWERS, AND MODES OF PROCEEDING 365 (1887).
42. See WALTER FAIRLEIGH DODD, THE REVISION AND AMENDMENT OF STATE
CONSTITUTIONS 79–80 (1910).
43. See ROGER SHERMAN HOAR, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS: THEIR NATURE,
POWERS, AND LIMITATIONS 91, 108, 122–23 (1917).
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on the convention’s power contained in the enabling
legislation that put the question of calling a convention to
the people. 44
As noted by the leading contemporary authority on state
constitutions, Professor Robert Williams, the majority of state
judicial rulings tend to confirm this point, 45 as does actual practice:
“[A]bout 15 percent of all state constitutional conventions were
substantially limited, and the proportion increased since World War
II.” 46
But, the skeptics will legitimately inquire, what about the
runaway convention, whose delegates ignore the limitations that
have been imposed and seek to submit to the electorate provisions
that lay outside those limits, perhaps in violation of an oath they took
upon becoming a delegate? The answer lies in external legal
constraints: the governing constitutional provision, or the call for the
convention, may preclude submission to the voters of extra-agenda
proposals, and both election officials and courts may be directed to
enforce that preclusion. Courts that have considered the question
have been willing to enforce limitations by ordering extra-agenda
proposals off the ballot. 47

44. A. E. DICK HOWARD, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA 1182
(1974).
45. WILLIAMS, supra note 40, at 394. See Staples v. Gilmer, 33 S.E.2d 49, 52 (Va. 1945)
(“If [the people] vote in favor of such a convention, they and not the legislature will limit the
work of the convention and its scope.”); see also Cummings v. Beeler, 223 S.W.2d 913, 917, 921
(Tenn. 1949) (agreeing with the holding in Staples v. Gilmer); cf. Gaines v. O’Connell, 204
S.W.2d 425, 431–32 (Ky. 1947) (upholding the legislature’s requirement, not otherwise contained
in the state Constitution, that the people ratify the convention results). But cf. Opinion of the
Justices, 81 So. 2d 678, 679–83 (Ala. 1955) (interpreting in a 4–3 Alabama Supreme Court
opinion Alabama’s constitution to preclude limits). As Professor Williams observes, the Alabama
court’s opinion is based on questionable reasoning and is, in any event, amenable to a
constitutional amendment that would provide for the option of a limited constitutional
convention. WILLIAMS, supra note 40, at 395. While these cases involved conventions called by
legislative action with ratification by popular vote, the governing principle, popular sovereignty,
would clearly apply a fortiori to a convention called directly by popular vote. Id.
46. WILLIAMS, supra note 40, at 392 (citing Levine, supra note 40, at 133 n.32). Some state
constitutions—for example, those in Kansas, North Carolina, and Tennessee—expressly provide
for calling a constitutional convention with a limited agenda. The Alaska Constitution, on the
other hand, expressly precludes limits on the powers of the convention, and the Montana
Constitution specifies that a convention called through the use of the initiative must be unlimited.
Id. at 392–93.
47. See Livermore v. Waite, 36 P. 424, 425–28 (Cal. 1894). When the question is raised after
the voters have already ratified the extra-agenda proposals, courts are split on whether relief may
be granted. Compare Snow v. City of Memphis, 527 S.W.2d 55 (Tenn. 1975) (entertaining
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V. CONCLUSION
There is a principled basis for sustaining the validity of an
initiative measure that would (1) amend the state constitution to
permit the people to call a constitutional convention through a ballot
measure and (2) authorize such a convention call both to specify a
procedure for selecting delegates different from that specified in the
current constitution and to specify limits on the convention’s agenda,
subject to judicial enforcement. Whether sufficient consensus exists,
or can be developed, to adopt such an initiative measure and to adopt
the delegates’ recommendations is, of course, an entirely different
question.

postelection challenge), with Malinou v. Powers, 333 A.2d. 420, 422 (R.I. 1975) (declaring
postelection challenge moot).

